Questions animating this course include: Why is force often used in international politics? What causes peace? How do wars, or competitions shaped by the lurking possibility of war, affect international relations and individual societies? How can governments best prepare to prevent wars or to win them if they occur? By what standards should resort to force, or strategic and tactical choices in combat, be judged legitimate or immoral? How are the prevention, outbreaks, processes, and outcomes of mass violence (or crises resolved short of combat) determined by politics, ideology, diplomacy, technology, economics, geography, military plans and tactics, intelligence, or arms control? What are similarities and differences among conflicts between states, within states, and between states and transnational groups (such as terrorists)? How important is terrorism? How do weapons of mass destruction coerce or deter? Is the world safer or more dangerous after the Cold War? Can war be made obsolete? The course emphasizes problems in the relation between political ends and military means. Students must grapple with the terms of reference in both dimensions. The course is organized thematically, not by cases, but illustrative examples are drawn from conflicts in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The course emphasizes issues in the 20th Century, and in U.S. national security policy.

Requirements: This is a graduate lecture course open to advanced undergraduates. It is designed to be demanding. Anyone who cannot or does not wish to read and ponder a heavy load of material should not take this course. All students must (1) complete assigned readings; (2) attend all lectures, arriving on time (seated NLT 11:00); (3) view two films (see p. 8 below); (4) take the final examination on the scheduled date (make-up exams will not be allowed except for certified medical excuse or family emergency). Undergraduates must also (5) take the mid-term examination (optional for graduate students) and (6) attend discussion sections (optional for graduate students). Students must give full attention to lectures and discussion sections. Multi-tasking is not allowed in class. Laptops may be used only for taking notes; students found to be checking E-Mail, surfing the Internet, or text-messaging will be asked to leave the class. At the final examination, students must leave all electronic devices except battery-powered watches (cell phones, laptops, i-pods, blackberries, and so on) at home or outside the examination room.

This is a survey course. To allow maximum time for reading there is no paper writing assignment. Reading averages just under 210 pages per week, but is concentrated in sections IV and VI-VIII. To help you plan reading time the numbers of pages in each item of reading, and for each section of the syllabus, are noted in brackets. The page total of reading required for the course is 2,937. Required readings are on reserve in Lehman Library. Books ordered in the College Bookstore and Book Culture should be purchased so that you can mark them up. Students who do the reading without marking or taking notes are fools, unless they have photographic memories and superhuman capabilities for mentally organizing a complex array of concepts, arguments, and historical examples.

Whatever the education system from which you come, understand that the purpose of this course is not to indoctrinate you with what the instructor believes to be the right answers. The purpose is to highlight crucial questions and ideas and expose you to the main currents of debate about them. Performance on examinations is judged by how well you understand debates and exploit relevant readings and lectures in answers.
I. **Introduction: Nature and Functions of War**

*Three Visions of Conflict: Does War Have a Future?*
*Concepts of National Security and Philosophy of War*
*Political Ends and Military Means: Rationality*
*War is Hell: Insanity and Obscenity*
*The Perspective Between Pacifism and Militarism*


Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”
John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War.”
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"


Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, Roger T. Ames, trans. (Ballantine, 1993), chaps. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 [25]. (The Sawyer, Griffith, or Huang translations are also acceptable.)


II. **Causes of War and Peace**

*Psychology and Anthropology: Instinct, Ritual, or Continuation of Sport by Other Means*
*Religion: Fighting for God*
*Main Paradigms: Realism and Liberalism*
*Autarky or Interdependence*
*Ideology and Fraternity*
*Feudalism, Capitalism, Marxism, Militarism*

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia University Press, 1959), chaps. 2-4, 6-8 [184].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [106]:

Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue”
E. H. Carr, “Realism and Idealism”
Geoffrey Blainey, “Power, Culprits, and Arms”
Margaret Mead, “War is Only an Invention -- Not a Biological Necessity”
Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace”
John Mueller, “The Obsolescence of Major War”
Norman Angell, “The Great Illusion”
Geoffrey Blainey, “Paradise is a Bazaar”
V. I. Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism”
Joseph Schumpeter, “Imperialism and Capitalism”
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Causes and Economic Effects”
Richard Rosecrance, “Trade and Power”
Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics.”
III. **Securing Peace: Balance of Power and Institutions**

*What is Stability? Equilibrium or Peace*
*Meanings of Balance of Power*
*Effects of Unipolarity, Bipolarity, Multipolarity*
*International Organization, “Regimes,” and Collective Security*


Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [19]:

Robert Gilpin, “Hegemonic War and International Change”
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence.”


IV. **Choosing War or Peace: Conquest, Coercion, Crisis Management**

*The Spectrum of Choice: Concession, Compromise, Combat*
*Setting the Price of Peace: Political Stakes vs. Military Costs*
*Setting the Price of War: Blood, Treasure, and Risk*
*Deterrence, Reassurance, Crisis Management, and “Accidental” War*
*Cases: 1914, 1938, 1962*
*Theory and Practice of Coercive Force: Bombing and “Compellence”*

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2-4 [154].


V. **Modern War: Constraints, Conditions, Conduct**

*Geography: Natural Security and Vulnerability*
*Economy: Resources, Power, and Strategy*
*Combined Arms: Armies, Navies, Air Forces*
*Campaigns and Logistics*

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [14]:

Niccolò Machiavelli, “Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered”
Alan S. Milward, “War as Policy.”

Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford University Press, 1974), chaps. 4-6 [62].


VI.  **Policy, Strategy, and Operations:**  
**Integrating Political Ends and Military Means**  

Three Levels of Analysis  
Technology: Innovations and Interactions  
Plans: Organization, Doctrine, Tactics, Obstacles  
Military Effectiveness: What Produces Success in Combat  
Attack and Defense: Aggressive, Preventive, Preemptive, and Defensive War  
How Ends Determine Means, How Means Determine Ends

Clausewitz, *On War,* Book I, chap. 7; Book II, chap. 3; Book III, chap. 1; Book VI, chaps. 1, 3, 5; Book VII, chaps. 1-5  [31].


Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*  [25]:  

Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (Ballantine, 1975)  [355].

VII.  **Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War**  

Estimating Costs, Benefits, and Feasibility  
Estimating the Culminating Point of Victory  
Total War: World Wars I and II  
Limited War: Korea and Kuwait  
Total or Limited? Iraq II

Clausewitz, *On War,* Book VII, chap. 22; Book VIII, chaps. 1-3, 6  [32].


Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin, 2006), chaps. 4-5, 7-8, 10  [119].

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Monday, October 20:  Mid-Term Examination

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VIII. **Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism**

*People’s War, Counterinsurgency, and Incentives for “Asymmetric” Strategies*

*Linkages Between Conventional and Unconventional War*

*Stealth, Strength, and Advantages of Attack Over Defense*

*Secular and Sacred Motivations*

Clausewitz, *On War*: Book VI, chap. 26; Book VIII, chap. 5  [12].


Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), chaps. 1, 6-8, 10  [109].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*  [92]:

T. E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare”

Mao Tse-tung, “On Guerrilla Warfare”

Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics”

Martha Crenshaw, “The Strategic Logic of Terrorism”

Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religious Radicalism and Political Violence.”

Marc Sageman, “Jihadi Networks of Terror”

Osama bin Ladin, "Speech to the American People."

Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003)  [19].

**Required Film:** See *The Battle of Algiers* before the end of Section VIII. Refer to questions on p. 8.

IX. **Society, Polity, Culture, and Capability**

*Nationalism, State Expansion, and Social Mobilization*

*Civil-Military Relations*

*Recruitment, Conscription, Organization*

*Culture and Combat Effectiveness*

*Combat Motivation: When Fighting Can Get One Killed, what Makes One Fight?*

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*  [38]:

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War”

Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”

Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition.”

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948)  [35].

Omer Bartov, *Hitler’s Army* (Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 3-4  [119].


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X. **When Is War Murder? The Moral Calculus of Killing** [84 pp.]

- Absolute vs. Utilitarian Criteria
- Atrocities: Cold Blood and Passion
- Are Some Lives Worth More Than Others?
- Is Terrorism Ever Legitimate?


**Required Film:** See *Saving Private Ryan* before lectures for Section X. Refer to questions on p. 8.

XI. **The Nuclear Revolution: Theory and Practice** [167 pp.]

- Nuclear Weapon Effects
- Deterrence and Compellence
- Rationality, Uncertainty, and Credibility
- Limited War and Escalation
- Nuclear War Plans and Operational Doctrine
- Cold War Crises


Paul Fussell, “Thank God for the Atom Bomb” in Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (Summit Books, 1988) [22].

XII. **Threat Assessment and Defense Planning** [92 pp.]

- Aggression or Security Dilemma?
- Intentions and Capabilities
- Deterrence and Provocation
- Intelligence and Uncertainty
- Strategic Assumptions and U.S. Force Planning


Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Can the Next Superpower Rise Without War?” in Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [12].

XIII. **Arms Control**

- Political, Economic, and Military Rationales for Arms Regulation
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Cold War Negotiations
- Conventional Forces: “Defense Dominance”?
- Arms Trade
- Costs and Benefits of Regulation
- Regional Conflicts and Incentives for Proliferation
- WMD After the Cold War: Biological, Chemical, Nuclear

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [21]:
- Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. and Abram N. Shulsky, “Arms Control: The Historical Experience”

XIV. **Conclusion: Evolving Bases of Conflict and Cooperation**

- Religion
- Power Without Force?
- Information Warfare
- Non-Lethal Weaponry
- Theories, Experience, and Prediction
- A “Revolution in Military Affairs”?
- Environmental Sources of Conflict
- Culture and Conflict


Biddle, *Military Power*, chap. 10 [18].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [25]:
- Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”
- Samuel P. Huntington, "Peace Among Civilizations?"

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- [http://sipa.columbia.edu/resources_services/student_affairs/academic_policies/deans_discipline_policy.html](http://sipa.columbia.edu/resources_services/student_affairs/academic_policies/deans_discipline_policy.html)

Violations of the Code of Academic and Professional Conduct should be reported to the professor and, for SIPA, to the Associate Dean for Student Affairs.

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Required Film Viewings

Times and places of showings to be announced.

1. **The Battle of Algiers** (1967), directed by Gilo Pontecorvo, screenplay by Franco Solinas (2 hours, 5 minutes). For section VIII of the course. To understand the film you must know the essential story of the Algerian war of independence. Remember that the French did not consider Algeria a colony, but a part of metropolitan France (it had about a million European settlers). Although fiction, several characters are composites of real historical figures (one of the FLN leaders plays himself in the movie). The realism of this film is demonstrated by the fact that after early showings the producers had to insert a notice at the beginning that it was not a documentary. While obviously pro-FLN, the film is also unusual in the extent to which it does not demonize the French, but empathizes with them. (Interestingly, the actor who played Colonel Mathieu was a French Communist!)

   - Were the tactics used on either or both sides illegitimate? Does the legitimacy or illegitimacy of terror or torture depend on the nature of the tactics or the justice of the cause they serve?
   - By what criteria were tactics employed effective or counterproductive?
   - Could either side have hoped to win without using those tactics? How are the issues of legitimacy and efficacy related?
   - How are terrorism and guerrilla warfare related?
   - In what respects are the issues posed by Al Qaeda today similar and different from those in this case?
   - Is Colonel Mathieu’s character evil, admirable, tragic, or something else?
   - How do the French and FLN strategies reflect Huntington’s points about the “tripartite” nature of revolutionary war or Mao’s points about guerrillas and population being “fish” and “sea”?
   - Have U.S. intelligence services learned the wrong lessons from this film?

2. **Saving Private Ryan** (1998), directed by Stephen Spielberg, screenplay by Robert Rodat (2 hours, 49 minutes). For section X. Look at the first 25-minutes (the assault on Omaha Beach) as one of the least unrealistic of Hollywood portrayals of combat. (Paul Fussell, of all people, approved heartily of this sequence.) Look at the rest of the film as an evocation of dilemmas about risking, deliberately spending, or wrongfully taking lives in wartime.

   - How should decisions to spend lives be made? By what criteria?
   - Whose decisions to spend lives in this venture were right or wrong?
   - Did the Americans who shot surrendering Germans in the overrunning of the bunkers on Omaha Beach commit a war crime that should have been prosecuted?
   - Was Upham right or wrong about whether to kill the prisoner the first time the question arose? The second time?